Ferry Boat Feasibility Study

Chapter 7 – Ferry Service Modeling

This chapter provides an evaluation of each of the two remaining ferry service alternatives and identifies the basis for selection of the preferred alternative. Much of the analysis commentary is recalled from Chapters 4, 5, and 6 and allows for a comparison of the benefits and constraints of the two alternatives.

The two final ferry service alternatives are:

• Woodbridge, Virginia to the Navy Yard in Washington, DC and
• Fort Washington, Maryland to the Pentagon in Virginia.

The service characteristics for both routes are summarized in Table 7-1 for unrestricted speed and restricted speed scenarios. The Fort Washington to the Pentagon route is approximately half the distance of the Woodbridge to the Navy Yard route. From a travel time point of view, Fort Washington passengers would travel 15 to 25 minutes less than the Woodbridge passengers. Since the service is predicated upon 30-minute headways, the Woodbridge service would also require more vessels to operate the route.
 

Table 7-1 - Service Profiles for Alternatives

Table 7-2 - Patronage Forecasts for Alternatives

Table 7-3 - Landside Capital Costs

Woodbridge to the Navy Yard

Waiting Shelters
ADA Compliance Measures
Pedestrian Improvements
Parking Lot Improvements
Access Improvements
Security Access Control at the Navy Yard

 $ 590,000

Waiting Shelters
ADA Compliance Measures
Pedestrian Improvements
Parking Lot Expansion
Access Improvements

 $ 800,000

Waterside Capital Needs and Costs

Start-up costs for water operations are primarily based upon the cost of high-speed ferry vessels and floating docks for making the connection between land and water. It is expected that each of the docking sites will require a floating dock. Since the Woodbridge to the Navy Yard route will require more vessels to maintain the 30-minute service headway, the waterside costs are $3-6 million more for the Woodbridge to the Navy Yard route as shown in Table 7-4. The range in the number of vessels assumed for each route is based on restricted and unrestricted travel speeds.

Table 7-4 - Waterside Capital Costs (Millions)

An optimum fare was developed based on the need to maintain reasonable levels of daily patronage and comparable fares with competing transit services. Initial testing of a $7.00 fare revealed limited ridership at that rate. Due to this finding, the $7.00 fare was dropped from further consideration. A $4.40 fare, comparable to the VRE fares, was utilized in part to seek better ridership. The lowered fare did garner additional patronage. Since one of the study’s objectives was to minimize the impacts of ferry service on other transit modes, fares lower than $4.40 were not considered. Table 7-5 presents alternative patronage projections for the base year at two different fare levels.

Design Year

TDM Benefits

The impacts of either ferry alternative on auto travel in general will be minimal. It is estimated that the most promising scenario in 2000 would result in less than 200 person trips shifting from auto to transit. This number includes all automobile person trips in the study area, most of which are currently using HOV3+ lanes on I-95. Similarly, year 2010 shows less than 750 auto person trips shifting from auto to transit. Only a portion of these trips would travel over the Woodrow Wilson Bridge or through the Springfield Interchange. The trips on I-95/I-395 are currently using the HOV lanes. The trips that would shift to transit are currently using HOV3+.

The potential for a vehicle ferry that would cross the Potomac River in proximity to the Woodrow Wilson Bridge was also examined as a means of alleviating traffic on the bridge during construction. The following issues were defined for examination:

• Do logical roll on/roll off termini locations exist along the Potomac River for a vehicle ferry operation?
• Can these termini be accessed from I-95 in a manner that does not impact local streets?
• How long would a ferry detour take and how would the detour time compare to traffic delays associated with bridge construction?
• How many vehicles could the ferry take off of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge on a typical day?

After performing a preliminary analysis of the feasibility of a vehicle ferry, the concept was rejected based on the following conclusions:

• Good termini locations for the vehicle ferry were not found in reasonable proximity to the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. Waterfront property is generally in private use or owned by the U.S. Park Service. The process of leasing or buying terminal areas, connecting them to the road system, and performing significant dredging activities would be very expensive.
• Reasonable access points to and from I-95 for a detour to ferry termini could not be found. The primary obstacle to this action is the impact of significantly increased local street traffic in Alexandria. Placing an additional 600 vehicles per hour on local streets, especially at night when the volume capacity of the ferry could make some impact on bridge traffic, would likely be faced with great opposition.
• It is estimated that departing and returning to I-95 at the nearest exit to the bridge would take approximately 25 to 30 minutes. This is a longer period of time than would be experienced by vehicles remaining on I-95, even during peak congestion periods.
• An estimated maximum of 600 automobiles per hour could be served by two 150 automobile vessels operating at a 15-minute headway. If trucks are allowed to use the ferry service, this number would be reduced.
• The cost of two ferries and the capital cost of improvements to create docking sites would be well over $10 million.
• The operating cost of the vessels, in service 18 hours a day, would be over $6 million a year.

After examining the small percent of traffic diversion volume to the ferry, the strong disincentive of adding extra time to cross the river, impacts on the shoreline, impacts on local streets, and the high capital and operating cost, implementation of a vehicle ferry to alleviate Woodrow Wilson Bridge traffic cannot be justified.


Summary and Conclusions

This chapter provided a comparison of the final two alternative routes. Based on the comparison, the Woodbridge to the Navy Yard route was selected as the preferred alternative. It is expected to carry more passengers and have slightly lower landside start-up capital costs. Due primarily to its higher patronage, the Woodbridge to the Navy Yard alternative is more favorable given the operating costs, lower subsidies per passenger, and higher farebox return. Table 7-6 summarizes the key operating factors for each alternative.

A major detractor of the Fort Washington to the Pentagon route was the imminent competing HOV improvements programmed for the Route 210 Corridor in Maryland. These improvements reduced the potential for significant high-speed passenger ferry boat patronage.

Table 7-6 - Final Service Profiles